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Errors trigger changes in behavior that help individuals adapt to new
situations. The dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) is thought to
be central to this response, but more lateral frontal regions are also
activated by errors and may make distinct contributions. We
investigated error processing by studying 2 distinct error types:
commission and timing. Thirty-five subjects performed a version of
the Simon Task designed to produce large number of errors.
Commission errors were internally recognized and were not
accompanied by explicit feedback. In contrast, timing errors were
difficult to monitor internally and were explicitly signaled. Both types
of error triggered changes in behavior consistent with increased
cognitive control. As expected, robust activation within the dACC and
bilateral anterior insulae (the Salience Network) was seen for
commission errors. In contrast, timing errors were not associated
with activation of this network but did activate a bilateral network
that included the right ventral attentional system. Common activation
for both error types occurred within the pars operculari and angular
gyri. These results show that the dACC does not respond to all
behaviorally salient errors. Instead, the error-processing system is
multifaceted, and control can be triggered independently of the dACC
when feedback is unexpected.
Keywords: cognitive control, dACC, error, salience network, ventral
attention network
Introduction
The ability to adapt behavior to new demands is a central feature
of cognitive control. Errors frequently result in behavioral
changes that allow individuals to adapt to new situations. For
example, slowing responses after an error is a common strategy
that generally makes future performance more accurate in
speeded reaction time tasks (Rabbitt 1966). Previous work has
focused on the contribution of the dorsal anterior cingulate
cortex (dACC) to behavioral adaptation. This region is activated
soon after errors of many types and appears to be a key part of
the neural network mediating error responses (Dehaene et al.
1994; Ridderinkhof et al. 2004; Debener et al. 2005; Sharp et al.
2006). Electrophysiological work has revealed an error-related
negativity (ERN). This appears likely to be generated by the
dACC (Dehaene et al. 1994; Debener et al. 2005), although
recent studies suggest that error-related responses are also
produced by other cortical regions (Eichele et al. 2008; Agam
et al. 2011).The dACC is tightly linked both structurally and
functionally to the anterior insulae (Dosenbach et al. 2006;
Seeley et al. 2007). Together these regions have been termed the
Salience Network, which is thought to act as an interface
between limbic and cognitive aspects of behavioral control
(Dehaene et al. 1994; Critchley et al. 2004; Seeley et al. 2007).
However, the error-processing system is likely to be multifaceted
and the precise contribution of the dACC to error processing
remains controversial (Jessup et al. 2010).
Reinforcement learning theory provides an important
framework within which to understand error processing. One
influential model proposes that the dACC indexes prediction
error signals generated by midbrain dopaminergic cells in
response to a mismatch between expected and actual out-
comes (Holroyd and Coles 2002, 2008; Holroyd et al. 2004). In
the initial formulation of this model, the dACC was thought to
act as a generic error monitor, responding to all types of errors
and signaling the need for a change in behavior. In favor of this
general role, activation of the dACC had been observed in
response to errors generated either internally, as a result of
a mismatch between expected and actual outcomes, or
externally, as the result of explicit feedback (Holroyd et al.
2004). However, more recent electrophysiological work
suggests that the dACC is sensitive to external feedback only
when it is perceived as being ‘‘learnable’’ or directly related to
the subject’s own behavior (Holroyd et al. 2009).
Neuropsychological studies provide converging evidence
that the dACC is required for certain types of error processing
(Swick and Turken 2002; di Pellegrino et al. 2007). However,
some types of behavioral adaptation have been shown to occur
after damage to the dACC, suggesting that involvement of the
region is not always required to initiate cognitive control
(Fellows and Farah 2005; Kennerley et al. 2006; Modirrousta
and Fellows 2008). Parts of the lateral temporoparietal lobes
and inferior frontal cortex have also been shown to respond to
behaviorally salient events, particularly unexpected events, and
have been labeled the ventral attentional network (Corbetta
et al. 2002). This network provides an alternative route by
which external information might engage cognitive control
potentially independent of the dACC.
Here, we use functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
to investigate 2 distinct types of behaviorally salient errors. A
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version of the Simon task designed to generate a large number
of errors of different types was used. Commission errors
involved responding with an inaccurate key press, whereas
timing errors involved responding after an externally imposed
time limit. During training, subjects were instructed that both
incorrect and late responses were to be considered errors on
the task, and this was reiterated during performance of the task
in the scanner. Commission errors were internally recognized
and involved no explicit feedback. In contrast, timing errors
were difficult to monitor internally and were explicitly signaled
on slow trials. Comparison of the neural response to these
errors measured using fMRI allowed an analysis of the error-
processing network associated with these distinct error types.
We specifically tested the hypothesis that the dACC generi-
cally signals the need for behavioral adaptation, by comparing
neural responses with internally generated commission errors
and to externally signaled timing errors on the same task. This
work builds on previous studies of error monitoring, but
importantly employs a task in which reward is not present. We
reasoned that if the dACC operates as a generic error monitor,
one would expect similar activation across distinct error types.
However, if dACC activation reflects a subset of error processing,
for example, only responding to errors perceived as emotionally
salient or where it is possible to generate a prediction error
signal, differential activation may be present in the dACC despite
adaptive behavioral change being triggered.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Thirty-five subjects performed the main Simon Task paradigm (17 males,
mean age 30.6 ± 8.6 years). A further 15 subjects performed a control
variant of the Simon Task designed to further investigate the effect of
explicit feedback (4 males, mean age 29.4 ± 6.9 years). Subjects gave
written consent. The experiment was approved by the Hammersmith
and Queen Charlotte’s, and Chelsea Research ethics committee.
Simon Task Procedure
Cognitive control was investigated during performance of the Simon
task. The Simon task is a stimulus/response compatibility task that uses
incongruency between the salient and nonsalient features of a stimulus
to generate response conflict (Simon 1969; Simon and Small 1969).
Building on previous electrophysiological work (Christ et al. 2000), we
used a version of the Simon task designed to produce large numbers of
errors of both commission and timing. Subjects were presented with
a colored cue to the right or left of a fixation cross (Fig. 1). Cue color
determined the direction of the required response: red signified a right-
hand response and blue a left-hand response. Spatial location and cue
direction were either congruent or incongruent with respect to each
other. In the incongruent condition, the prepotent response—to
respond in the direction of the spatial location of the cue rather than
the direction signaled by the color—must be inhibited. Errors of
commission occur when the subject’s direction of response is not that
signaled by the color. In the main part of the experiment, explicit
feedback about errors or commission was not provided. Hence, any
neural response to these errors was internally generated. Errors of
timing were generated by explicit feedback given when a subject
responded outside the time limit. Feedback was presented in the form
of the words ‘‘Speed up’’ displayed on the screen accompanied by
a 400-Hz auditory tone, which emphasized the error. Visual and
auditory feedback lasted 500 ms. Subjects were told at the start to
perform the task as accurately and quickly as possible and were aware
that slowing down would result in error signal about the timing of their
responses. This was emphasized during training and also between runs
of the paradigm performed in the scanner.
An adaptive staircase procedure was used to vary the response delay
necessary to trigger feedback with the goal of producing errors of
commission within a target range. At the start of the experiment,
feedback was triggered if a subject’s response was more than 500 ms
after the presentation of the color stimulus. After the first 15 trials, the
rate of commission errors was calculated after each trial, and the time
limit was adjusted if this rate fell outside the target range. For congruent
trials, a target commission error range of 8--12% was used. The time limit
was increased by 50 ms if the error rate was high and decreased by the
same amount if it was too low. Adaptation was performed separately for
incongruent trials, aiming for a range of 17--25% commission errors. The
time limit was adapted within a range of 400--1000 ms. For subsequent
runs, the starting time limit was carried over from the previous run.
Two thirds of trials were ‘‘congruent’’ and one-third ‘‘incongruent’’.
All subjects performed 6 runs of 120 pseudorandomly ordered trials
with interstimulus intervals of 2.25 s. To increase task difficulty, we
introduced a precue in the form of empty rectangle that filled in after
200 ms with the color that indicated response direction. The precue
increased the interference effect produced by a spatially incongruent
color cue. The relative timing of the precue and color cues was
designed to generate the maximum number of errors of commission
(Christ et al. 2000). All subjects performed 120 trials (80 congruent and
40 incongruent) as training prior to scanning.
Behavioral Analysis
Mean error rates and reaction times were calculated separately for
congruent and incongruent trials. In addition, behavior was investigated
on trials surrounding errors. This allowed the effects of cognitive
control to be observed as posterror slowing after commission errors
and postfeedback speeding after timing errors. The accuracies of these
trials were also assessed and compared with subject’s accuracy across
the entire run.
The trials before an error (N–1), the error trials (N), and up to 3 trials
following an error (N+1, N+2 and N+3) were investigated. Reaction
times were compared to a baseline performance on trials of that type,
(i.e., congruent or incongruent), calculated from the mean of the last
ten stable correct trials of a particular type. Stable correct trials were
defined as correct timely trials that had also been preceded by a correct
timely trial. Baseline performance was calculated this way firstly to
avoid contamination from the effects of internal and external feedback
on preceding trials, and also to control for slow fluctuations in subject’s
attention.
Figure 1. Schematic of the Simon task paradigm. Subjects responded with a right or
left finger press for red and blue cues, respectively. The precue, an empty square,
appeared to either the left or right side of the fixation cross for 200 ms before filling in
with the cue color (either red or blue). (a) On congruent trials, the spatial location of
the cue corresponded to the side of the appropriate response press. (b) On
incongruent trials, the spatial location conflicted with the side of the response.
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Image Acquisition
MRI data were obtained using a Philips (Best, The Netherlands) Intera 3.0
Tesla MRI scanner using Nova Dual gradients, a phased array head coil, and
sensitivity encoding (SENSE) with an under sampling factor of 2. fMRI
images were obtained using a T2*-weighted gradient--echo echoplanar
imaging (EPI) sequence with whole-brain coverage (time repetition [TR]/
time echo [TE] = 2000/30; 31 ascending slices with thickness 3.25 mm,
gap 0.75 mm, voxel size 2.19 3 2.19 3 4 mm, flip angle 90, field of view
280 3 220 3 123 mm, matrix 112 3 87). Quadratic shim gradients were
used to correct for magnetic field inhomogeneities within the brain. The
inferior part of the cerebellum was not included in our field of view. T1-
weighted whole-brain structural images were also obtained in all subjects.
Paradigms were programmed using Matlab Psychophysics toolbox
(Psychtoolbox-3 www.psychtoolbox.org) and stimuli presented through
an IFIS-SA system (In Vivo Corporation). Responses were recorded
through a fiber optic response box (NordicNeurolab, Norway), interfaced
with the stimulus presentation PC running Matlab. Sounds were presented
using ear-defending headphones (MR Confon).
Whole-Brain fMRI Analysis
Data was analyzed with standard random effects general linear models
using tools from the FSL library (FEAT version 5.98) (Smith et al. 2004).
Image preprocessing involved realignment of EPI images to remove the
effects of motion between scans, spatial smoothing using an 8-mm full-
width half-maximum Gaussian kernel, prewhitening using FILM and
temporal high-pass filtering using a cutoff frequency of 1/50 Hz to correct
for baseline drifts in the signal. FMRIB’s Linear Image Registration Tool
was used to register EPI functional data sets into standard MNI space
using the participant’s individual high-resolution anatomical images. fMRI
data were analyzed using voxelwise time-series analysis within the
framework of the General Linear Model. To this end, a design matrix was
generated with a synthetic hemodynamic response function and its first
temporal derivative. For congruent and incongruent trials, a number of
distinct event types were modeled: correct trials (appropriate response
within the time limit), errors of commission (incorrect button press but
within the time limit), errors of timing (correct button press but outside
of the time limit), errors or both timing and commission, and confounded
trials where timing or commission errors occurred directly after another
timing or commission error. Commission and timing errors were
contrasted with correct trials, as well as being directly contrasted with
each other. Group effects analysis was carried out using FLAME (FMRIB’s
Local Analysis of Mixed Effects). Separate analyses were performed for
congruent and incongruent trials. Errors of both commission and timing
were insufficient to be analyzed. Final statistical images were thresholded
using False Discovery Rate threshold of P < 0.05.
Region of Interest Analysis
An additional focused region of interest (ROI) analysis was performed
using Featquery within FSL. A number of anatomically defined frontal
lobe regions known to be involved in error processing were investigated.
These consisted of left and right anterior cingulate cortices (ACC) and
anterior insulae, as well as left and right pars operculari and pars
triangulari within the inferior frontal gyri. Probabilistic masks were
defined from the Harvard Cortical Atlas tool in FSL and were thresholded
at 70%. The regions were all available in the atlas apart from the anterior
insula. To generate the anterior insula mask, the insula atlas map was
divided along the anterior--posterior dimension into 2 halves. For each
axial slice, the image was divided at the midpoint along the anterior--
posterior dimension. This produced anterior and posterior insula masks.
Mean percentage signal change associated with contrasts of interest was
calculated for all voxels falling within each ROI.
Time-Series Analysis
To investigate whether commission and timing errors were associated
with different time courses, Perl Event-related Average Time-course
Extraction was used to further characterize the neural responses
within the dACC (www.jonaskaplan.com/peate/peate-tk.html). The
mean time series from a 10-mm diameter spherical ROI within the
dACC was extracted. To test whether the dACC responded to all types
of error, we used an ROI centered on the peak activation for the
contrast of errors of commission versus correct trials (x = 2, y = 32, z =
28). The response was examined for a period 2 s proceeding to 12 s
following a subject’s response.
Additional Investigation Controlling for the Presence of External
Feedback
In the main version of the Simon task errors of timing were signaled by
explicit ‘‘error’’ feedback, but errors of commission were not. To test
whether this difference influenced dACC activation, we performed an
additional study with a separate group of 14 subjects. Here, both types
of error were accompanied by explicit feedback. The design of the
experiment was the same as that described above except for the
presence of audio--visual feedback for errors of commission. This took
the form of the word ‘‘Wrong!’’ presented after an error of commission,
accompanied by a 500 Hz tone. The timing and duration was the same
as for error of timing described above.
Analysis of Strategic Differences in Task Performance:
Comparison of High and Low Timing Error Groups
The number of timing errors was variable across individuals and runs.
This is likely to reflect strategic differences in the perceived salience of
timing feedback. During task performance, subjects could either focus
on reducing errors of commission, reducing errors of timing, or they
could adjust their speed-accuracy trade-off in a more complex way to
achieve an optimum reduction in both error types. Therefore, the
number of timing errors on a particular run is likely to reflect a subject’s
strategy on that run. To assess whether this variability affected neural
activation within the cognitive control system, we analyzed the
behavioral data from all subjects and compared runs with high numbers
of timing errors to those with low numbers (defined by taking the
upper and lower thirds of the distribution). To focus on the effects of
variable strategy with respect to timing, we only included runs where
the commission error rate fell approximately within the ranges that the
paradigm was designed to produce (i.e., 3--17% congruent and 12--30%
incongruent errors). This resulted in the potential inclusion of 169 runs
(Fig. 8a). Three subjects had separate runs that would have been
included in the High Timing error and others in Low Timing error
groups. In these cases, the runs that were in the minority were
removed from the analysis (i.e., if a subject had 3 runs included in the
High and 1 run in the Low Timing error group then the run in the Low
Timing error group would be excluded from the analysis). We did this
to avoid mixing between-subject effects and within-subject effects. As
a result, 3 single runs were removed from the analysis. The Low Timing
error group consisted of 53 runs spread across 23 subjects (0.83--6.7%
timing errors) and the High Timing group of 54 runs across 22 subjects
(13.3--48.33% timing errors). Comparison of errors of timing against
correct trials was made for the 2 groups using a standard mixed level
analysis, and the resulting contrasts were then directly compared.
Results
Behavior on the Simon Task
Behavioral performance was in keeping with previous studies
(Christ et al. 2000). Subjects performing the main version of the
Simon Task produced a total of 5992 errors. Relatively large
numbers of errors of both commission (11.7% of all trials) and
timing (12.1% of all trials) were committed. This was expected
and was probably due to the substantial increase in overall task
difficulty that the timing feedback adds, coupled with the fact
that performances on congruent and incongruent trials are not
independent. A significantly larger number of errors of commis-
sion were produced on incongruent than on congruent trials (t =
3.65, degrees of freedom [df] = 34, P = 0.001). Furthermore, as
a percentage of the number of congruent and incongruent trials,
commission errors were substantially more common on in-
congruent trials (t = 9.81, df 34, P < 0.0005) (Fig. 2). We
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performed an additional analysis to help clarify reason for the
high error rate on congruent trials. We assessed how the
congruency of the trial immediately before a trial affected
subjects’ accuracies. Correct congruent trials were more likely
to have been preceded by another congruent trial than incorrect
congruent trials (68.5% vs. 56.3%, df = 34, t = 25.29, P < 0.0005).
Similarly, correct incongruent trials were more likely to have
been preceded by another incongruent trial than incorrect
incongruent trials (37.5% vs. 34%, df 34, t = 5.76, P < 0.0005).
Although the effect size was differed between congruent and
incongruent trials, indicating that the effect of previous trials was
less for incongruent trials.
Most timing errors involved a button press with the correct
hand (87.5 ± 1.7% of all timing error trials). Significantly more
timing errors were produced on congruent than incongruent
trials (t = 5.89, df = 34, P < 0.0005). However, as congruent
trials were more frequent, the percentage of timing errors was
similar for the 2 trial types (t = 1.26, df = 34, P = 0.216) (Fig. 2).
A small number of timing errors were also errors of
commission, that is, a subject responded late and with the
wrong hand. The frequency of this type of error was similar for
both congruent and incongruent trials (1.5 ± 0.28% and 1.2 ±
0.24% of congruent and incongruent trials, respectively). These
were not analyzed further because of their low number.
Response speed had a major effect on the accuracy of
incongruent trials (Fig. 2). A 2 3 2 ANOVA showed a significant
interaction between trial type and accuracy (F = 127.2, P <
0.0005). This was due to subjects responding slower on correct
incongruent trials than to correct congruent trials (t = 10.6, df =
34, P < 0.0001), whereas subjects responded faster to incorrect
incongruent trials than incorrect congruent trials (t = 2.89, df =
34, P < 0.0001). This is consistent with a speed-accuracy trade-off
operating for incongruent trials, where fast responses are more
likely to be wrong because of a premature response to a spatially
contradictory cue. Timing errors were, by definition, significantly
slower than correct trials (t = 10.49, df = 34, P < 0.0005), and
incongruent timing errors were slightly slower than congruent
timing errors (t = 2.71, df = 34, P = 0.01) (Fig. 2).
Errors of Commission and Timing Both Produce Adaptive
Changes in Behavior
We investigated adaptive behavior by studying the slowing of
responses following errors of commission and the speeding of
responses following feedback after timing errors (Fig. 3). In the
first case, the adaptive ‘‘signal’’ is internally generated, as there
is no explicit feedback. In the second, as we only included
correct button presses in the analysis, the adaptive ‘‘signal’’
arises from the external feedback given after a late response.
Both types of feedback were behaviorally salient. For errors
of commission, the behavioral effect was only present on
incongruent trails (Fig. 3). Incongruent commission errors (C)
were relatively fast compared with baseline (t = 15.66, df = 34, P
< 0.0005) and posterror slowing was observed on the next trial
(C + 1) (t = 8.11, df = 34, P < 0.0005). In contrast, errors on
congruent trails were not abnormally fast and were not
followed by posterror slowing. Fast responses on incongruent
trials are very likely to result in errors; therefore, slowing
response speed on the next trial is an effective strategy to
improve performance. In contrast, errors on congruent trials
are much less influenced by this type of speed-accuracy trade-
off, so posterror slowing is far less adaptive in this context.
As expected, external feedback after a timing error resulted
in speeding of subsequent responses (Fig. 3). In contrast to
errors of commission, both trial types were associated with
postfeedback speeding. Errors of timing (T) were by definition
slower than average ([t = 24.43, df = 34, P < 0.0005] for
congruent timing errors and [t = 10.37, df = 34, P < 0.0005] for
incongruent timing errors). In the case of congruent timing
errors, which were far more numerous, all 3 subsequent trials
were faster than baseline (‘‘T + 1,’’ t = –3.47, P = 0.001, ‘‘T + 2,’’ t =
–6.91, P < 0.0005, ‘‘T + 3,’’ t = –4.04, P < 0.0005), whereas for
Figure 2. Simon task behavioral performance. (a) Rate of commission errors shown for congruent and incongruent responses. (b) Average reaction times (millisecond) for
correct trials and commission errors separated based upon the trial congruency. (c) Rate of timing errors for congruent and incongruent trials. (d) Average reaction times
(millisecond) for congruent and incongruent timing errors.
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incongruent timing errors, this was true only for the second
and third trials after the timing error (‘‘T + 2,’’ t = –3.79, P =
0.001, ‘‘T + 3,’’ t = –2.68, P = 0.012). The postfeedback speeding
is not simply a product of responses getting quicker over the
course of a run. In fact, the opposite trend is observed, with
responses generally slowing, which is demonstrated by the first
tertile being significantly quicker than the last (t = 9.91, df = 33,
P < 0.0005). In addition to being faster, the trial immediately
following a timing error (T + 1) is also more accurate than
a subjects’ average accuracy over the run (t = 4.02, df = 34, P <
0.0005), again suggesting that subjects engage greater cogni-
tive control in response to timing feedback.
Neuroimaging
Errors of Commission Activate the dACC
The network of brain regions activated by errors of commission
(Fig. 4) was consistent with previous work (Garavan et al. 2002;
Ullsperger and von Cramon 2003; Hester et al. 2004, 2005).
Extensive activation was seen in the dACC during errors of
commission compared with correct trials. In addition, peaks of
activation were observed in the superior frontal gyrus, bilateral
anterior insulae, and pars operculari, as well as in the frontal
poles and supramarginal and angular gyri (Table 1). There was
also activation of subcortical structures, including the brain-
stem and bilateral thalami. Extensive activation in the ACC and
insulae fell within what has been termed the Salience Network
(Seeley et al. 2007). Similar patterns of activation were
observed for errors of commission on congruent and
incongruent trials. A direct contrast of errors on both trial
types showed no significant differences in brain activation.
Errors of Timing Activate Lateral Prefrontal and Superior
Frontal Regions but Not the dACC
Compared with errors of commission, errors of timing were
associated with activation in a distinct and only partially
overlapping network. Relative to correct trials, errors of timing
were associated with activation in the pars opercularis, which
extended forward into the pars triangularis bilaterally, and also
in the anterior part of the medial superior frontal gyrus (Fig. 4).
More posteriorly, activation was seen in superior temporal
regions extending into the inferior parietal lobe bilaterally. This
included activation of the angular and supramarginal gyri
bilaterally. Activation was not observed within the ACC and
only marginally spread into the anterior insulae from the
overlying inferior frontal gyrus. Significant subcortical activa-
tion was seen in the brain stem and bilateral caudate nuclei.
A direct contrast of commission versus timing errors
demonstrated that activation was significantly higher in the
Salience Network for errors of commission. Peaks for this
contrast were seen in the ACC and the bilateral insulae, as well
as in the frontal poles and angular gyri (Fig. 5). The reverse
contrast showed greater activation bilaterally within the pars
triangulari for timing errors, as well as increased activation
within the posterior cingulate cortex (Fig. 5).
Common Activation for Errors of Commission and
Timing Is Seen within Pars Operculari
A conjunction analysis demonstrated brain regions commonly
activated by errors of commission and timing (Fig. 5). Common
activation was observed in the pars operculari bilaterally, as
well as within the inferior parietal lobes, and the anterior part
of the medial superior frontal gyrus, the anterior thalami and
temporal poles bilaterally. A ROI analysis using anatomically
defined frontal masks confirmed the presence of distinct
patterns of activation for the 2 types of error, as well as
common activation within the pars operculari (Fig. 5). Errors of
commission resulted in significant activation of the ACC and
bilateral anterior insulae (right ACC [t = 4.96, df = 34, P <
0.0005]; left ACC [t = 4.37, df = 34, P < 0.0005]; right anterior
insula [t = 4.04, df = 34, P < 0.0005]; and left ACC [t = 6.04, df =
34, P < 0.0005]), whereas timing errors were associated with
activation of the pars triangulari bilaterally (right t = 6.56, df =
34, P < 0.0005 and left t = 4.17, df = 34, P < 0.0005). There was
no significant activation of the ACC in timing errors compared
with correct trials. Common activation relative to baseline was
seen in the pars opercularis bilaterally for both error types.
Timing errors showed significantly greater activation in the left
(t = 5.09, df = 34, P < 0.0005) and right pars opercularis (t =
3.99, df = 34, P < 0.0005) compared with baseline; as did
commission errors (left pars opercularis [t = 4.31, df = 34, P <
0.0005] and right pars opercularis [t = 3.75, df = 34, P = 0.001]).
Figure 3. Adaptive changes following errors of commission and timing. (a) Posterror
slowing on incongruent trials. Reaction time for trials around a commission error (C)
relative to baseline performance. (b) Postfeedback speeding following errors of
timing. Reaction times for trials around an error of timing (T) Relative to baseline
performance. * indicates trials that significantly differed from baseline performance
for the preceding 10 correct trials of a similar type. Columns represent the accuracy
of the trial around either commission errors (a) or timing error (b). Columns are
hashed if the trials accuracy significantly differs from subjects’ normal performance.
Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.
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Delayed Activation of the dACC Is not Present after Errors
of Timing
Although errors of timing occurred slightly later than errors of
commission (152 ms average difference), this did not account
for the differences we observed in dACC activation. This small
difference in timing is highly unlikely to produce difference in
activation between the 2 types of error, and small variations in
the hemodynamic response function were modeled using
temporal derivatives. In addition, we performed a time-course
analysis to confirm that delayed dACC activation was not
present (Fig. 6). dACC activation was observed for errors of
commission, which peaked around 6 s after the response was
made. Following a commission error, activation of the dACC
was significantly greater than following either correct trials or
timing errors from 3 to 9 s after the response. In contrast,
timing errors caused no statistically significant signal change
compared with correct trials at any time point.
Controlling for the Presence of External Feedback on
Errors of Timing
We also investigated whether the absence of external feedback
after errors of commission could have influenced the difference
in brain activation that we observed within the dACC. In a new
version of the task, errors of commission were also signaled by
explicit external feedback in a similar way to timing errors.
Overall, the behavioral results for the control experiment were
similar to the main experiment. Comparing the 2 experiments,
there were no significant differences in overall reaction times
(351 and 340 ms, P = 0.149) or number of late responses per run
(14.5 and 13.2, P = 0.684). Similar behavioral adaptation was also
observed after errors of commission and timing (Fig. 7). There
were slightly fewer overall errors in the control experiment (11.7
± 0.4% vs. 7.8 ± 0.9%), which was due to both fewer congruent
errors (5.3 ± 0.4% vs. 3.1 ± 0.4%) and incongruent errors (6.4 ±
0.4% vs. 4.7 ± 0.7%). The neuroimaging results were also similar.
The contrasts of commission and timing errors with timely
correct responses showed similar activation to the main version
of the task (Fig. 7). The direct contrast of commission and timing
errors again confirmed increased dACC activation for commission
errors using a small volume correction with a 10 mm diameter
sphere centered around the peak of the activation difference
between error types in the main analysis (X = 2, Y = 32, Z = 26).
Strategic Differences in Task Performance: Comparison
of High and Low Timing Error Groups
Runs with low and high numbers of timing errors were
compared, as we reasoned that they involve different perfor-
mance strategies. Low numbers of timing errors suggest that
subjects performed the task as requested, maintaining a gener-
ally fast response speed. In contrast, high numbers suggest that
subjects paid less attention to the feedback, which is likely to
be the result of a strategic decision to optimize accuracy over
timing. Despite this strategic difference, timing feedback still
had the effect of changing behavior in both groups in the
immediate period following an error (Fig. 8). An ANOVA was
performed using group assignment as one factor (High or Low
Timing error) and time relative to the timing error trial (T) as
a second factor with 5 levels (T – 1, T, T + 1, T + 2, and T + 3).
There was no interaction between group type and time,
demonstrating the similarity of the short-term response to
timing feedback. In addition, there was no group difference in
the average reaction times for correct trials (338 ± 5 ms for the
High Timing group and 325 ± 5 ms for the Low Timing group),
indicating that nonspecific differences in factors such as
arousal level were not present.
The contrast of timing error and correct trials in both groups
showed a pattern of activation similar to that seen for the
overall effect of timing errors (Fig. 8). Activation was observed
in the right superior frontal gyrus, bilateral pars triangulari,
operculari, and the supramarginal gyri. No regions showed
significant differences in activation when directly comparing
the 2 groups. In addition, neither group showed any significant
activation of the dACC.
Discussion
We investigated the neural response to errors using event-
related fMRI and provide evidence for a multifaceted error-
processing system. A modified version of the Simon Task was
used to generate large numbers of errors of both commission
and timing. This allowed detailed analysis of the patterns of
brain activity associated with these errors. While being quite
different in nature, both types of error were associated with
behavioral adaptation on subsequent trials, suggesting the
engagement of cognitive control. As expected, commission
errors activated the dACC and other parts of the Salience
Figure 4. Errors of commission and timing. (a) Areas of significant brain activation associated with errors of commission compared with correct trials (red--yellow). (b) Areas of
significant brain activation associated with errors of timing compared with correct trials (light—dark blue). Results are superimposed on the MNI 152 T1 1-mm brain template.
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Network, and led to an adaptive behavioral change in the form
of posterror slowing after incongruent trials. In contrast, timing
errors were not associated with increased dACC activation,
despite being explicitly signaled by feedback and leading to
behavioral change. Strategic differences in task performance
did not explain this result. The lack of dACC activation
associated with timing errors demonstrates that cognitive
control processes that affect behavior can be triggered by
errors without an increase in activation of the dACC. In
contrast, timing errors were associated with extensive activa-
tion elsewhere in the brain, including within parts of the
ventral attentional system, with specific activation observed in
the pars triangularis. This provides an alternative anatomical
route by which behavioral control may be engaged, which is
potentially independent of the dACC.
Cognitive control links performance monitoring to sub-
sequent task performance, and the dACC has been placed at its
heart (Badre and Wagner 2004; Botvinick et al. 2004; Kerns
et al. 2004; Ridderinkhof et al. 2004; Rushworth et al. 2004; di
Pellegrino et al. 2007). Our results show that involvement of
this region depends on the nature of the error. In keeping with
previous work, the region was extensively activated during
commission errors (Falkenstein et al. 2000; Ridderinkhof et al.
2004; Debener et al. 2005). In contrast, timing errors were not
associated with increased dACC activity. During performance
of the task, it was repeatedly emphasized that pressing the
wrong button and responding late should both be considered
to be an error, and evidence that subjects considered this to be
the case is provided by the adaptive changes in behavior
observed. Commission errors on incongruent trials produced
typical posterror slowing, which is often taken to indicate that
cognitive control has been engaged. In contrast, timing errors
were followed by postfeedback speeding. On this particular
task, the speeding of responses after an error is distinct from
the general trend of responses to slow as each run progresses
and is also associated with a better than average accuracy for
the subsequent response. Hence, this adaptive change in
response speed is also indicative of increased cognitive control.
Models of cognitive control frequently propose that the
dACC is involved in signaling a need for increased control,
which leads to a change in behavior (Ridderinkhof et al. 2004).
The amount of dACC activation can be related to the
magnitude of posterror slowing (Gehring et al. 1993; Kerns
et al. 2004), although this is not always observed (Li et al.
2008). In keeping with a role in monitoring but not
implementing behavioral change, our results show that high
dACC activation is not necessarily associated with behavioral
adaptation, as congruent commission errors strongly activated
the region but were not followed by posterror slowing (Fig. 3).
A key question is what does the dACC monitor and over what
time scale does it operate? A feedback-related negativity (fERN)
has been demonstrated with similarities to the ERN (Miltner
et al. 1997). Similarly, certain types of feedback are associated
with dACC activation demonstrated with fMRI (Holroyd and
Coles 2002; Holroyd et al. 2004; Ullsperger et al. 2007), although
differences in reward may influence dACC activity (Bush et al.
2002). However, our results are not compatible with the
proposal that the dACC signals all behaviorally salient errors
(Holroyd and Coles 2002; Holroyd et al. 2004). We observed no
increase in dACC activation after timing errors, despite explicit
external feedback that changed behavior. Work in nonhuman
primates shows the preservation of rapid responses to errors but
impaired strategic learning in animals with ACC lesions
(Kennerley et al. 2006), also suggesting that rapid cognitive
control can be engaged without dACC involvement.
Subtle changes in timing are often difficult to perceive (Allan
1978; Miltner et al. 1997; Luu et al. 2000; Grondin 2010), and an
important factor in explaining our results is likely to be the
unpredictability of our external feedback. A number of factors
make it highly unlikely that subjects were able to accurately
judge the timing of their responses. First, the cutoff for timing
feedback varied from trial to trial; second, separate timing limits
were used for congruent and incongruent trials; and finally, the
trial types were randomly intermixed, making it very difficult to
learn the timing rules for the 2 trial types. The magnitude of the
ERN depends on whether feedback is predictable (Hajcak et al.
2005; Holroyd et al. 2009) providing evidence that the ACC is
involved in cognitive control only when action-outcome con-
tingencies can be learned (Holroyd et al. 2009). This has lead to
Table 1
Cluster analysis for contrasts of different error types
Anatomical
region
False
discovery
rate (q value)
MNI coordinates
X Y Z
Commission errors [ correct trials
Anterior cingulate gyrus \0.05 2 32 28
Left frontal pole \0.05 30 50 20
Right frontal pole \0.05 28 52 22
Left insula cortex \0.05 38 16 14
Right insula cortex \0.05 58 14 2
Left supramarginal gyrus \0.05 62 46 28
Right supramarginal gyrus \0.05 64 48 28
Left thamamus \0.05 8 14 3
Right thalamus \0.05 7 16 3
Brain stem \0.05 0 28 10
Timing errors [ correct trials
Left inferior frontal gyrus (pars triangularis) \0.05 52 23 16
Right inferior frontal gyrus (pars triangularis) \0.05 60 44 6
Frontal pole (midline) \0.05 0 58 28
Precuneus \0.05 0 48 12
Left caudate \0.05 8 11 2
Right caudate \0.05 8 5 4
Left lateral occipital cortex \0.05 30 92 20
Right lateral occipital cortex \0.05 28 92 26
Left middle temporal gyrus \0.05 64 44 6
Right middle temporal gyrus \0.05 57 18 20
Commission errors [ timing errors
Anterior cingulate gyrus \0.05 4 32 28
Left insula cortex \0.05 38 12 8
Right insula cortex \0.05 44 10 8
Left frontal pole \0.05 32 48 16
Right frontal pole \0.05 28 54 26
Left supramarginal gyrus \0.05 52 40 38
Right supramarginal gyrus \0.05 56 46 34
Left thamamus \0.05 12 13 1
Right thalamus \0.05 3 11 2
Brain stem \0.05 2 22 8
Timing errors [ commission errors
Left inferior frontal gyrus (pars triangularis) \0.05 56 24 10
Right inferior frontal gyrus (pars triangularis) \0.05 58 30 14
Left middle temporal gyrus \0.05 60 20 12
Right middle temporal gyrus \0.05 64 15 12
Precuneus \0.05 3 53 32
Left superior frontal gyrus \0.05 7 56 34
Left lateral occipital lobe \0.05 30 92 22
Right lateral occipital lobe \0.05 30 92 16
Areas common to commission and timing errors [ correct trials
Left inferior frontal gyrus (pars opercularis) 47 18 19
Right inferior frontal gyrus (pars opercularis) 50 15 14
Left supramarginal gyrus 63 48 27
Right supramarginal gyrus 62 44 20
Brain stem 2 29 10
Left thamamus 10 1 5
Right thalamus 8 1 3
Left temporal pole 40 10 25
Right temporal pole 41 10 25
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a reformulation of the reinforcement learning theory in which
the ACC is involved in cognitive control only when monitoring
involves production of an internally generated prediction error.
Our results are in keeping with this distinction, as unpredictable
feedback was not associated with dACC response.
Variation in the predictability of feedback could explain
differences between our work and previous electrophysiological
studies in this area (Miltner et al. 1997; Luu et al. 2000). For
example, Miltner and colleagues show the presence of an fERN
when subjects were provided with feedback 600 ms after an
error on a time estimation task. Although the criterion for success
was adaptively varied, there remained a relatively predictable
relationship between performance and feedback. Hence, the
fERN could be interpreted in the context of the generation of
a prediction error. In a further study, Yuu and colleagues studied
a cognitively demanding flanker task with a reaction time limit
that triggered negative feedback when breached (Luu et al.
2000). This studies design was similar in many ways to ours, but in
this case, timing errors were associated with the generation of an
ERN. However, in contrast to our study, monetary reward was
used to increase motivation, which confounds interpretation of
the findings. In addition, the ERN amplitude was shown to
increase as responses became later. This is compatible with
prediction errors increasing in magnitude as the presence of
a timing error became more predictable.
A further potential explanation for the absence of dACC
activity during timing errors is low levels of response conflict on
these trials. The dACC is activated in situations where response
conflict is high, which arises when 2 or more response processes
are simultaneously activated (Botvinick et al. 2001, 2004) Conflict
can occur before a response, for example, on incongruent trials
when there is conflict between the spatial location and the color
response cue, or after a response, for example, as a result of
Figure 5. Common and distinct activation for errors of commission and timing. (a) A conjunction analysis showing common activation for both types of error (green). The direct
contrast of error types shows brain regions more activated by errors of commission (red) or timing (blue). Results are superimposed on the MNI 152 T1 1-mm brain template.
(b) ROI analysis using anatomically derived masks. Significant differences from baseline are shown by *. Right (R), left (L), anterior (ant), and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC).
Figure 6. Perl Event-related Average Time-course Extraction (PEATE) analysis. Graph
of the averaged BOLD signal change across subjects within the ACC for the 12 s
following correct trials, commission error trials, and timing error trials. ACC activity
was sampled from a region around the peak of activation associated with errors of
commission versus correct trials. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.
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attempts to immediately correct an erroneous response (Yeung
et al. 2004). Timing errors are likely to have low levels of both
pre- and postresponse conflict, because they are predominantly
congruent and cannot be corrected with an alternative response,
potentially explaining the absence of increased dACC activity. In
contrast, incongruent commission errors are associated with
preresponse conflict because of conflicting spatial and color
information, and both congruent and incongruent errors of
commission are associated with postresponse conflict, which may
actually be greater for congruent errors, potentially explaining
the similar levels of dACC activation on these 2 trial types (Yeung
et al. 2004).
Our results clearly show distinct patterns of activation
within the lateral frontal region. The dACC is tightly linked
both structurally and functionally to the anterior insulae,
forming what has been termed the Salience Network
(Dosenbach et al. 2006; Seeley et al. 2007). The anterior
insulae show robust activation in response to errors of many
types, and may specifically respond to the conscious awareness
of errors (Klein et al. 2007; Ullsperger et al. 2010). Our results
are compatible with such a role following internally generated
errors. However, in a similar way to the dACC, externally
signaled timing errors were not associated with anterior insulae
activation, suggesting that this structure is not always necessary
for behavioral adaptation to occur.
In contrast, common activation was seen within the pars
operculari and the supramarginal gyri. In the right hemisphere,
these regions form part of what has been termed the ventral
attentional network (Corbetta and Shulman 2002). This network
responds to behaviorally relevant events, particularly when they
are unexpected or salient (Corbetta et al. 2002; Sharp et al. 2010),
and appears important for reorienting attention. Our results are
compatible with this role in response to errors, and suggest that
both internal and external events trigger similar activity within
Figure 8. Strategy analysis. (a) Graph illustrating the timing and error rates of runs used in the analysis. Timing error rates for separate runs plotted against the commission error
rate for that run (averaged for congruent and incongruent errors). Runs were used from the upper or lower third of the distribution. (b) Graph of reaction times on errors of timing
(T) and on trials around this (T  1 and T þ 1 to 3). Behavioral data is plotted separately for groups with high and low timing errors. c) Brain regions activated by the contrast of
timing errors compared with correct trials in the Low Timing error group. (d) Brain regions activated by the contrast of timing errors compared with correct trials in the High Timing
error group. Results are superimposed on the MNI 152 T1 1-mm brain template.
Figure 7. Errors of commission and timing in small group of subjects using an alternative Simon Task paradigm with additional external feedback after commission errors.
(a) Areas of significant brain activation associated with errors of commission compared with correct trials (red--yellow). (b) Areas of significant brain activation associated with
errors of timing compared with correct trials (light—dark blue). Results are superimposed on the MNI 152 T1 1-mm brain template.
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the network. The ventral attentional network is usually consid-
ered to be a right lateralized system, which complicates this
interpretation as we observe bilateral inferior frontal and inferior
parietal activation. However, unexpected behaviorally relevant
events such as ‘‘odd ball’’ stimuli have previously been shown to
produce bilateral activation in these regions (Stevens et al. 2000;
Fichtenholtz et al. 2004). The bilateral activation we observe may
be due to additional cognitive processing required to process the
behavioral significance of the errors in our task.
Moving more anteriorly along the inferior frontal gyrus,
a striking change in activation pattern was observed. In
contrast to the common pars opecularis activity, greater
activation was observed for timing errors in the pars triangulari.
This is important as it provides evidence that timing errors
were not simply less internally salient and so associated with
less increase in neural activity. The increase in pars triangulari
activity may be explained by the rostral--caudal organization of
the lateral prefrontal cortex initially proposed by Koechlin
et al. (2003). In this model, cognitive control processes are
organized in a cascade, with the sensory control involved in
selecting motor actions supported by lateral premotor regions
and higher level control processes supported by more anterior
regions. It is proposed that the pars triangularis is involved in
the episodic control of behavior, guiding stimulus-response
mapping on the basis of either past events or future plans. The
key difference between timing and commission errors in this
respect may be that the former are not perceived as being
causally linked to the current behavioral episode because of
their unpredictability, and hence engage control processes that
allow behavioral adaptation over an extended time period.
Different types of error can vary in their salience, and the
pattern of errors we observed suggest that subjects may vary in
their motivation for avoiding the 2 error types. As motivational
factors affect the magnitude of the ERN (Gehring et al. 1993),
this might influence the response of the dACC. We investigated
this possibility by capitalizing on the large variability in the
numbers of errors of timing across different runs and across
individuals to investigate this possibility. The number of timing
errors was used as a marker of the internal saliency of the
feedback, that is, how motivated individuals were to consistently
provide rapid responses. Our analysis showed that runs with
high and low numbers of timing errors showed similar patterns
of brain activation. In particular, the Salience Network was not
activated in either situation, suggesting that variability in internal
salience was not the reason for a difference in dACC activation.
The difference in dACC activation was unlikely to be because of
methodological issues. First, the absence of external feedback
during errors of commission did not in any way influence the
dACC result, as demonstrated by our control experiment. Second,
the frequency of error occurrence was not an important factor as
errors of timing and commission accounted for similar proportions
of the total number of trials. Finally, subtle timing differences
between error types were not an important factor. Errors of timing
occurred on average around 150 ms after errors of commission.
We explicitly modeled this in our event-related design and added
temporal derivatives of the error timings (Smith et al. 2004), which
has the effect of correcting for intersubject temporal differences
in the generation of the BOLD response. In addition, although the
physiological response to errors of timing might be expected to
occur around 200 ms after than the response to errors of
commission (Miltner et al. 1997), our fMRI analysis is highly
unlikely to be sensitive to this temporal difference. We observed
widespread activation of other brain regions to timing errors,
which provides evidence that the slight delay in timing error was
not enough to explain the lack of dACC activation. Furthermore,
we performed an additional time-series analysis of neural
activation within the dACC, which confirmed that there was no
evidence of late ACC activation following errors of timing.
Taken together, our results suggest that the dACC does not
respond to all types of behaviorally salient error. In keeping
with neuropsychological work (Modirrousta and Fellows
2008), the results suggest that the performance monitoring
system is multifaceted, and cognitive control can be triggered
independently of the dACC. Differences in dACC activity
associated with errors of timing or commission may be due
to different levels of feedback predictability or conflict present
in the 2 situations. An alternative route exists to engage cognitive
control, and this involves a bilateral frontoparietal network,
including regions thought of being part of the ventral attentional
system. The common activation of the pars opercularis across
both types of error is in keeping with this region signaling,
a general requirement for a shift in cognitive set.
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